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,Jan. 1954] Fox v. Fox 
[42 C.2d 49; 265 P.2d 881] 
[L. A. No. 22431. In Bank. Jan. 8, 1954.] 
LILLIAN R. FOX, Respondent, v. WILLIAM J. FOX, 
Appellant. 
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[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Par-
ties.-\Vhere provisions for support and maintenance of wife 
are an integral and inscvcrablc part of a property settlement 
agreement, her express promise not to seek alimony other 
than as provided in such agreement cannot be abrogated 
without changing the agreement. 
[2] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settle-
ment Agreements-Interpretation.-In absence of conflicting 
extrinsic evidence, interpretation placed on a property settle-
ment agreement by trial court is not binding on Supreme 
Court on appeal. 
[3] !d.-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settlement Agreements 
-Interpretation.-Labels adopted by parties to a property 
settlement agreement, such as that monthly payments pro-
vided therein are alimony, are not conclusive, since agree-
ment must be considered as a whole. 
[4] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Par-
ties.-To the extent that monthly payments provided for in 
a property settlement agreement are designed to discharge 
obligation of support and maintenance of wife, they will 
ordinarily have some of indicia of alimony, although they 
may not in fact be alimony. 
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
The fact that monthly payments provided for in a property 
settlement agreement for support and maintenance of wife 
might be reduced under certain specified circumstances does 
not indicate that they were alimony. 
[6] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settle-
ment Agreements- Interpretation.- Provisions for support 
and maintenance of wife may be included in agreements that 
are solely property settlements, and where they expressly 
provide that in no event are the payments to fall below a 
designated sum per month and are to cease on a fixed date 
without reference to wife's needs or husband's ability to pay 
after that time, they lend support to conclusion that at 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 44 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Husband and Wife, § 264. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] Divorce, § 203; [2, 3] Hus-
band and Wife, §157(6); [6] Husband and Wife, §§157, 157(6); 
[7] Divorce, § 180 ( 4). 
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least part of payments constitute a division of property as 
such. 
[7] Divorce-Counsel Fees-Effect of Agreement Between Spouses. 
-Where property settlement agreement contains waiver by 
wife of all attorney fees other than $300 provided in such 
agreement, and its validity has been adjudicated in divorce 
action, trial court errs in awarding fees in violation of its 
terms. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County increasing monthly payments for support 
and maintenance of divorced wife and awarding attorney 
fees. Otto J. Emme, Judge. Reversed. 
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright, Charles 
A. Loring and Dudley K. Wright for Appellant. 
Stahlman & Cooper and \¥allace E. Wolfe for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In1947, plaintiff :filed an action for divorce 
against defendant on the ground of extreme cruelty and 
prayed for a division of the community property and ali-
mony. Thereafter the parties executed a separation agree-
ment, and plaintiff amended her complaint to allege that by 
the terms of the agreement ''all of the community property 
and rights therein and rights of support have been adjusted, 
settled and compromised." She prayed that "the Court 
approve and incorporate in the decree the terms of that 
certain Agreement and Property Settlement made, executed 
and entered into by the Plaintiff and Defendant on the 13th 
day of April, 1948, and require by the terms of its decree 
that the Defendant comply with the terms in said decree 
for him to be performed.'' Defendant defaulted, and an 
interlocutory decree was entered approving the agreement 
and expressly incorporating the provisions for the payment 
of alimony, which defendant was ordered to perform. The 
final decree was entered one year later. In 1952, plaintiff 
petitioned the court to increase the monthly payments from 
$400 to $700 per month on the ground of changed circum-
stances and requested attorney fees for presenting her motion. 
After a hearing the court entered its order increasing the 
monthly payments to $500 per month and awarding $100 
attorney fees, and defendant has appealed. 
Defendant contends that, although the monthly payments 
were labeled alimony both in the agreement and in the decree 
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based thereon, it is clear from an examination of the agree-
ment as a whole that the provision for them was an integral 
of a property settlement agreement and may not there-
fore be modified. We agree with this contention. 
In their agreement the parties recited that they desired 
finally to settle all of their property rights and stated that 
"in consideration of the premises and of the covenants, agree-
ments, releases, waivers and transfers herein made and herein 
agreed to be made by the parties hereto, one to the other, 
it has been and is hereby agreed between the parties as 
follows: ... 
''THIRD: It is understood and agreed that this settlement 
is to obtain at all times between the parties hereto regardless 
of any change in the marital relations between them and the 
happening of any other event shall not abrogate or affect 
this instrument. 
"FoUR'l'H: Nothing in this agreement shall be construed 
as precluding either party from bringing or defending or 
appearing in any suit for divorce, and in the event a divorce 
be granted to either party, this agreement may be incorpo-
rated in and become a part of any such decree of divorce 
entered .... 
'' SrxTH: Husband agrees to pay to the wife, as alimony, 
the sum of four hundred dollars ($400) per month, com-
mencing May 12th, 1948, and continuing thereafter to and 
including the month of December, 1953, (except as other-
wise herein provided) at which time all obligation on the 
part of the husband to make the aforesaid or any other 
payments to the wife for her support shall thereupon termi-
nate." 
The agreement then provided that payments for the sup-
port of the wife should terminate if she should remarry before 
December 31, 1953, and that after her remarriage or De-
cember 31, 1953, whichever occurred earlier, the husband 
should pay her $100 per month for the support of each of the 
two minor children of the parties. It also provided that if 
the husband's United States disability pension should be 
reduced, the support payments should be reduced $3.33 for 
each $10 reduction in the pension. In no event, however, 
was the wife to receive less than $200 per month. 
The seventh, eighth and ninth paragraphs provided for a 
detailed division of the community property, including the 
payment of $8,000 cash to the wife, and adjusted rights with 
respect to insurance policies and a retirement fund. 
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The tenth paragraph provided: "I-I us band agrees to pay 
Blanche & Fueller, attorneys for the wife, as their attorneys' 
fees, the sum of three hundred dollars ($300) of which 
amount one hundred fifty dollars ( $150) shall be payable 
upon the execution of this agreement by the parties hereto 
and the remaining one hundred fifty dollars ($150) of which 
shall be payable on or before ninety ( 90) days from date 
hereof. In consideration of the agreement of the husband 
to pay the aforesaid fees, the wife hereby agrees that in any 
action for divorce or separate maintenance between the 
parties hereto, whether the same be now pending or hereafter 
commenced, she will not make application for or seek to 
require the payment of any attorneys' fees whatsoever by 
the husband and that she will likewise pay such costs of 
suit involved in any such action herself and shall not call 
upon the husband to pay any part thereof. 
''The wife further agrees that she will not, in any such 
action, apply for or seek from the husband any payment of 
alimony or support money for the children of the parties 
except in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.'' 
[1] In this case, as in Dexter v. Dexter, ante, p. 36 
[265 P.2d 873], it is clear that the provisions for the 
support and maintenance of plaintiff are an integral and 
inseverable part of the property settlement agreement of 
the parties. The parties stated that they desired to effect 
a final settlement that would ''obtain at all times between'' 
them and expressly provided that the agreement was made 
in consideration of "the premises, and of the covenants, 
agreements, releases, waivers, and transfers herein made and 
herein agreed to be made." Thus plaintiff's express promise 
not to seek alimony other than as provided in the agreement, 
cannot now be abrogated without changing the property set-
tlement agreement of the parties. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that since the payments were 
labeled alimony, were to cease on her remarriage, and were 
subject to modification in the event of a reduction of defend-
ant's pension, there is evidence to support the trial court's 
implied :finding that they were solely alimony subject to 
modification. [2] In the absence of conflicting extrinsic 
evidence, the interpretation placed upon the agreement by 
the trial court is not binding on this court on appeal. (Estate 
of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 825]; Lane v. Lane, 
117 Cal.App.2d 247, 251 [255 P.2d 110]; see, also, Gosnell v. 
Webb, 60 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [139 P.2d 985] ; Miranda v. Mi-
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randa, 81 Cal.App.2d 61, 69 [183 P.2d 61].) [3] The 
labels adopted by the parties are not conclusive, since the 
agreement must be considered as a whole. (Tuttle v. Tuttle, 
38 Cal.2d 419, 422 [240 P.2d 587] ; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 
Cal.2d 833, 842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d 
526, 530 [112 P.2d 780].) [4] Moreover, as pointed out 
in the Dexter case, to the extent the monthly payments are 
designed to discharge the obligation of support and main-
tenance, they will ordinarily have some of the indicia of 
alimony. [5] Similarly, the fact that the payments might 
be reduced under certain specified circumstances does not 
indicate that they were alimony. [6] Not only may the 
parties include such provisions in agreements that are ad-
mittedly solely property settlements (Hogarty v. Hogarty, 
188 Cal. 625, 628 [206 P. 79]), but the provision in this case 
lends support to the conclusion that at least part of the 
payments constituted a division of property as such. Thus 
in no event vvere the payments to fall below $200 per month, 
and they were to cease on a fixed date without reference 
to plaintiff's needs or defendant's ability to pay after that 
time. 
[7] The award of attorney fees was contrary to plaintiff's 
waiver of all fees other than the $300 provided for in the 
agreement. Since plaintiff has never attacked the agreement, 
and since its validity has been adjudicated in the divorce 
action, the trial court erred in awarding fees in violation 
of its terms. (Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520, 523-525 
[196 P.2d 909]; Viera v. Viera, 107 Cal.App.2d181, 183-184 
[236 P.2d632] .) 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in 
the judgment reversing the order, but I disagree with some 
of the reasoning leading thereto. 
In this case the parties had agreed that certain payments 
were to be made to the plaintiff; the portion of this agree-
ment referring to said payments was incorporated in the 
decree of divorce. Upon application for modification, plaintiff 
wife was granted an increase in the monthly payments as 
well as additional attorneys' fees. Plaintiff contended that 
there was evidence to sustain the trial court's implied finding 
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that the payments were intended solely as alimony subject 
to modification. This court, in the majority opinion, says: 
''In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the inter-
pretation placed upon the agreement by the trial court is 
not binding on this court on appeal.'' In effect, the majority 
is saying that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's implied finding that the payments were alimony 
and not a part of a property settlement agreement. This 
result flows naturally from its determination that the pay-
ments were part of a property settlement agreement. 
This case, as well as the Dexter and Flynn cases, has run 
the full judicial gamut provided for in this state. This 
unnecessary and costly procedure could be avoided in the 
future if the rule were settled that where parties have agreed 
upon a division of their property, or for support and main-
tenance for one of them, and that agreement is found by 
the court in the divorce action to be fair and equitable, and 
approved by it, their agre.ement is considered as the sum of 
their rights and liabilities and is not subject to modification 
in the absence of a provision in the agreement to that effect. 
This is as it should be and would provide the necessary 
measure of stability in such cases. I have, in my dissents in 
the Flynn and Dexter cases, set forth the reasons for such 
a rule and the necessity for it in that parties, and their 
attorneys, should be able to rely upon the proposition that 
property and support rights arising out of the termination 
of a marital relationship once settled by agreement should 
remain settled and courts should not be called upon to decide 
whether the payments provided for are alimony or a part 
of a property settlement. As I said in my dissent in the 
Dexter case, when the parties have settled their property 
and support rights and liabilities by agreement which has 
been approved by the trial court as fair and equitable, the 
question as to the character of any payments to be made 
should be forever closed to inquiry. Whether or not the 
provisions of the agreement are incorporated in the decrees 
of divorce should only affect the remedy to be pursued in 
the event of a failure to comply therewith. 
Because the parties hereto agreed for Rpecific payments to 
be made and received and because plaintiff waived all rights 
to any other attorneys' fees than those set forth in the agree-
ment, I would reverse the order appealed from. 
